digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Faculty Scholarship

Articles & Chapters

1984

Introduction [comments]: From First Amendment
rights and the Cable Television Industry
Michael Botein
New York Law School, michael.botein@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Communications Law Commons
Recommended Citation
6 Comm. & L. 45 (1984)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Communications and the Law

From First Amendment Rights and the
Cable Television Industry

MICHAEL BOTEIN

Introduction*
Michael Botein, who coordinated the
conference that resulted in these
proceedings, is professor of law and
director of the Communications Media
Center at New York Law School. He
holds a B.A. from Wesleyan University
(1966), a J.D. from Cornell University
(1969), and a J.S.D. from Columbia
University (1979).

In a strictly technological sense, cable television is not an engineering
innovation, but rather the oldest new technology in town. Although the origins
of cable date back to the 1950's, the industry saw little economic development
until the mid-1970s. I As a result, a substantial body of legal doctrine did
not begin to develop until then.
Moreover, until the end of the last decade, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) provided virtually the entire day-t<Hlay legal environment
in which the cable industry lived. 2 Most of the initial legal issues concerning
cable focused on the scope of the Commission's jurisdiction and the validity
of its regulations. Having recognized the sin of regulation during the last
few years, however, the FCC has engaged in succe:-sive orgies of "reregulation" under Chairman Richard E. Wiley, "deregulation" under Chairman
Charles D. Ferris, and now "unregulation" under Chairman Mark Fowler.
The Commission apparently has found cable far easier than broadcasting to
deregulate, partially because no statutory scheme governs cable and partially
because cable creates no electrical interference-and thus no need for some
type of private or governmental frequency allocation functions. 3
• Special thanks are due Leonore Larraquente, Glen Richards, and Louise Zito for their
assistance in editing and cite-checking the papers for this symposium.
1.
Cable Television Report and Order, 36 F.C.C. 2d 141 (1972).
2.
For an excellent and concise history of the F.C.C.'s early regulation policy, see
C. D. FERRIS, F. W. LLOYD AND T. J. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAw:
COMMUNICATIONS PRACTICE GUIDE 5-4 et seq. (1983).
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See, e.g., Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. F.C.C. 326 U.S. 327 (1945).

Communications and the Law

45

MICHAEL BOTEIN

The main focus of the law today is on the relationships between cable
operators, state or local governments, and programmers. The tensions in this
tripartite relationship implicate the first amendment in several ways. Operators
seek immunity from obligations to either governmental bodies or programmers. Cities want to impose program content control on both operators and
programmers. And programmers want to reach cable viewers, despite
operators' or cities' objections to the content of their programming.
In order to explore these emerging first amendment issues, the Communications Media Center at New York Law School, with the generous support
of Meckler Publishing Company and the Playboy Foundation, convened an
intensive conference on October 21-22, 1983. Special thanks are due to
Burton Joseph, Kenneth Norwick, Janel M. Radtke, David M. Rice, R. Bruce
Rich, and Eudry Sell for their assistance in organizing the conference. The
conference focused on the three major papers published in this issue of Communications and the Law, by Glen Robinson, Thomas Krattenmaker, and
Douglas Ginsburg. For reasons of space, it unfortunately is impossible also
to print the comments from the conference's fifteen distinguished panelists;'
suffice to say, however, that their participation added immeasurably to the
proceedings' breadth and depth.
These papers discuss the comparative rights and obligations of operators,
cities, and programmers. Robinson begins by reviewing the general history
and first amendment status of the electronic media, pointing up the ambiguities in the law and suggesting that we ought to "be ready for almost anything."5 Krattenmaker then discusses probable types of content regulation
and their validity, arguing that distinctions exist between the first amendment
status of broadcasting and cable under the Pacifica decision. 6 Finally,
Ginsburg points out the social and economic implications inherent in the
existence of access channels and concludes that in first amendment terms
the best approach is to leave content control to cable operators' commercial
and non-ideological incentives.
These articles do not purport to resolve or even fully identify a host of
still evolving questions as to cable's first amendment status. They are
suggestive rather than definitive. Nevertheless, they give a preliminary look
at an increasingly important area of first amendment jurisprudence. We hope
they will spark further thought on these issues.

4.

6.

The panelists were: Daniel Brenner, Les Brown, Joseph Ferris, Heather Florence,
Brenda Fox, James Goodale, Paul Klein, Alan Meckler, James Mercurio, Michael
Meyerson, Mark Nadel, Dean Ringal, Frederick F. Schauer, Sam Simon, and
Morris Tarshis.
Robinson, Cable Television and the First Amendment 6, no. 5 COMMUNICATIONS
& L. 47-61 (October 1984).
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 430 U.S. 726 (1978).
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